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FOREWORD           
 
In March 2018, the Defence Committee’s own inquiry into North Korea and 
the threat it poses concluded that Kim Jong-un was ruthless but rational, 
and that his regime was unlikely to move towards denuclearisation after 
reaching such a late and highly advanced stage. We recommended a policy 
of deterrence and containment, both now and after North Korea achieves 
its goal of acquiring intercontinental ballistic missiles fitted with nuclear 
warheads. 
This new country-by-country analysis, produced by a six-panel roundtable 
of experts hosted by SOAS, KCL and the Henry Jackson Society, seeks 
possible ways forward if recent negotiations are to have a chance of making 
progress. By systematically charting the perceived aims and objectives of 
China, Japan, the USA, Russia and the two Korean states, it poses ‘primary 
questions’ in relation to each of those countries. 
The hardest to answer are undoubtedly those regarding the sincerity of 
North Korea and China in contemplating complete denuclearisation, in 
return for concessions and support from other powers in the region. 
Provided that they are serious, then there is much of value in this 
comprehensive examination of the central issues in a peace-bargaining 
process. It is certainly worth a try. 
 
Dr Julian Lewis  
Chairman, House of Commons Defence Committee  
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ABBREVIATIONS           
CVID    Complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation 
CVIS    Complete, verifiable, irreversible security 
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) 
FAO    Food and Agriculture Organization (UN) 
FFVD    Final, fully verified denuclearisation 
HI    Handicap International  
IAEA    International Atomic Energy Agency  
IGO    International Government Organization  
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
NGO    Non-government organization 
RFE    Russian Far East 
ROK    Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY          
As North Korea and the United States of America continue to meet 
bilaterally in an attempt to resolve the nuclear issue, it is important to 
understand what every member of the Six-Party Talks – the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (South Korea), the United States of America 
(USA), the Republic of Korea (North Korea), China, Japan and Russia – 
wants to gain from the negotiations and their negotiating strategies. While 
this list is not meant to be comprehensive, it is meant to reflect the current 
priorities of each state, as identified by our experts. 
North Korea 
 North Korea wants to guarantee regime survival and seeks economic 
development, both on its own terms. It also craves legitimacy and 
international status. 
 The best way to persuade North Korea to agree to complete, 
verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation (CVID) is to guarantee the 
security of the regime and offer it status and prosperity. 
 North Korea should concede that a peace regime will only come at 
the end of a step-by-step CVID/sanctions relief process. 
United States of America 
 The Trump administration wants CVID, or final, fully verified 
denuclearisation (FFVD), of North Korea. 
 While willing to establish a process towards FFVD, the Trump 
administration is interested in short-term gains, for a combination of 
national security and domestic reasons. 
 The USA wants to consolidate or maintain its alliance with South 
Korea, something which, no doubt, plays into the dynamics 
surrounding the negotiations with North Korea, China and Russia. 
 The US should concede on North Korea’s desire for a step-by-step 
approach, since the ‘Libya Model’ presents Pyongyang with risks. 
South Korea 
 South Korea has two main aims: economic growth and resolving the 
North Korea crisis. 
 In order to achieve these, President Moon will continue to facilitate 
talks while promoting the use of non-military means. 
 Progressives inside the Moon administration are interested in 
promoting economic growth in North Korea as soon as possible. 
 Seoul must accept that any economic development and aid will have 
to come late in the step-by-step process once considerable steps to 
dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and steps to 
dismantle the international sanctions regime. 
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China 
 China’s President Xi Jinping will support denuclearisation efforts as 
long as the North Korean regime is stable.  
 Beijing’s willingness to continue pressuring North Korea by the real 
application of economic sanctions is integral to the success of the 
current iteration of negotiations. 
 There is a possibility that US–China tensions, economic and military, 
will “bleed” into the negotiation positions of the USA and into China’s 
unique relationship with North Korea. 
 China must be willing to accept change on the Peninsula. 
Japan 
 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants the return of abductees and CVID. 
These two objectives are of equal importance for Tokyo. 
 Japan seeks a seat at the negotiating table, but if it cannot achieve 
this, then Tokyo will attempt to persuade President Trump to raise 
the abductions issue with North Korea. 
 Japan must accept that the abductees issue will only be resolved 
after CVID and the establishment of a peace regime – during a 
reconstruction period. 
Russia 
 President Vladimir Putin wants to keep a foothold on the Korean 
Peninsula and oversee a reunification that benefits Russian interests. 
Moscow is likely to push for reunification that would create a neutral 
state. 
 Russia is pursuing a balanced policy; however, its interests cannot be 
met if it does not get to the negotiating table. 
 Moscow must concede that it has very little to offer CVID 
negotiations, and must be content to only become involved during 
the Peace Regime and post-regime reconstruction. 
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INTRODUCTION           
 
“Managing the Korean crisis felt like playing a multi-tiered chess game on 
overlapping boards. It required dealing with the North, the South, China, 
Japan, the IAEA, the UN, the non-aligned movement, Congress, the press, 
and others.” 
~Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert Galluchi 
Going Critical: The First North Korean Crisis (2004) 
 
The presidency of Donald Trump has coincided with an advancement in 
North Korea’s ability to hit the American mainland with its growing nuclear 
arsenal. Over the past year, the result of both factors has led to a new level 
of tensions between Pyongyang and Washington DC. Unusually, the Trump 
administration focused much capital on pushing China to enforce economic 
sanctions on the North Korean regime; these bore fruit in bringing Kim 
Jong-un to the negotiating table in June.    
Following the seeming success of President Trump’s “maximum pressure” 
policy, Pyongyang has shown itself willing to negotiate and, despite being 
under pressure, it seems to have led the tempo. And despite strong rhetoric 
from Trump and some near-cancellations, both the President and the Vice-
President showed themselves willing to engage with Pyongyang. For those 
who have watched the region for decades, the pace of regional diplomacy 
has been remarkable. 
In short order, we have seen two North–South summits, three USA–North 
Korea meetings (and one summit) and three visits by North Korea to China 
for what we can presume were summits. For their part, Russia and Japan 
have been sidelined completely and have maintained their interests in 
meetings in Washington and Pyongyang. However, despite all the 
diplomatic activity, it is clear that only principles have been agreed. The 
Panmunjom Declaration agreed between South Korean President Moon 
Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in late April says little 
substantive about denuclearisation, only that it is a “common goal” of the 
two states. Likewise, the USA–North Korea document signed at the historic 
summit in Singapore falls short of detail, saying only: 
Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK 
commits to work towards complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. 
Nor was there any public announcement or statement made during any of 
the three visits by Kim Jong-un to China. It is in this context that HJS, KCL, 
and SOAS convened an expert panel in London on June 5th, which was able 
to discern three “wide” goals and one “narrow” goal in the current situation 
on the Korean Peninsula.  
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First, there is the wide goal of North Korean denuclearisation. Wide in the 
sense that CVID is shared equally by the USA, South Korea and Japan and, 
while the goal is not clearly specified in the same manner, North Korea, 
Russia and China also agree to the principle of denuclearisation.  
Second, there is a wide goal of establishing a “peace” regime on the Korean 
Peninsula. This is shared by all the parties but remains problematic for a 
number of reasons. It must be agreed by all parties to the Korean War 
(1950–1953) plus the UN, since the mission in South Korea remains a key 
part of South Korea’s defence. There is concern within the US policy 
community that a peace treaty could lead to popular demands to bring US 
troops home, so the USA has long sought to ensure that any such peace 
treaty would allow for a continuing presence on the Korean Peninsula.  
Third, there is the issue of economic investment and reconstruction of 
North Korea. To some extent this is a goal of Seoul and Pyongyang, but 
remains a point of divergence for Russia and China, who both want to 
integrate North Korea into their own economies. It also presents leverage 
for countries like Japan (upon which reconstruction loans, perhaps labelled 
as “reparations” for colonial rule, are expected), which have found 
themselves thus far excluded from the negotiations process.  
Fourth, there is the abductees issue, a narrower problem which only affects 
Tokyo, and which is driven by domestic politics in Japan. To some extent, 
while the USA and South Korea pay lip service to this issue, it is often an 
afterthought to that of denuclearisation. For its part, Japan has sought to 
insert the abductee issue into the wider discussion of denuclearisation and 
peace-making, aware that without sufficient pressure the issue will simply 
lapse. Despite this, Japan will still have leverage in any post-treaty stage, 
when reconstruction and investment into the North Korean economy are 
being negotiated.  
In in all of this, it seems that at least three of the players – the USA, South 
Korea and China – have shown an unusual level of diplomatic flexibility over 
the past five months. There have been shifts in positions previously thought 
fixed. For example, North Korea relaxed the “freeze-for-freeze” demand – 
often promoted by Beijing – as one of its conditions of a USA–North Korea 
summit. President Trump also demonstrated flexibility and awareness of 
North Korean sensibilities in his offer to suspend the annual joint military 
drills after signing the Singapore Declaration. Despite heavy criticism from 
some quarters that the suspension was too great a concession, Trump’s 
decision is one that can be reversed depending on the overall state of 
progress of denuclearisation. 
Then there has been South Korea, perhaps the unsung hero of this 
diplomatic flexibility. With a strong desire to push for a peace deal, the 
Moon administration has taken a number of daring chances. The immediate 
acceptance of a joint “Peace Team” at the Pyeongchang 2018 Winter 
Olympics by Moon following Kim’s suggestion was criticised internally, but 
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was certainly the staging ground for a Panmunjom Summit. Then there has 
been China, which faced the most criticism of all during the “maximum 
pressure” stage. Despite the fact that it has played a back-seat role to the 
Olympics, the North–South Summit, and the USA–North Korea Summit in 
Singapore, the fact is that Beijing has helped bring this about by applying 
serious pressure on sanctions enforcement, particularly in the banking and 
energy sectors. While it is easy to criticise China for such a loose sanctions 
regime in the past, it must be recognised that it has played a helpful role 
behind the scenes. Whether that will continue to be the case – given its 
trade conflict with the Trump administration – remains to be seen. 
This project has made clear that despite the new-found flexibility among 
the actors, one of the most important factors in deciding the success or 
failure of the negotiations is sequencing. For example: 
1. Should a peace regime precede denuclearisation or vice versa? 
2. Should denuclearisation precede sanctions-easing or vice versa? 
3. Should economic projects precede denuclearisation or vice versa? 
4. Should verification precede sanctions-easing or vice-versa? 
This report is the outcome of a six-panel round table that was hosted by 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, Kings College London and the 
Henry Jackson Society on 5 June, little more than a week before the USA–
North Korea Summit was held in Singapore. Our group represented a host 
of institutes and expertise, including Hayato Hosoya from Chatham House, 
Tat Yan Kong from SOAS, Natasha Kuhrt and Ramon Pacheco Pardo from 
Kings College London, John Nilsson-Wright from Cambridge University, 
and Andrea Berger from the Monterey Institute for International Studies, as 
well as representatives from the South Korean and UK governments. The 
round table was organised much like this report, with one expert delivering 
to the group a paper on an assigned country. In giving their remarks, our 
experts sought to clarify for the group the nature of that country’s drivers 
on the Korean Peninsula and stated and unstated diplomatic objectives.  
Going forward, it is hoped that this report, will serve – at the very least – as 
a resource for understanding the North Korean nuclear crisis, easily one of 
the most complex and difficult problems in contemporary international 
relations. While we hope that students of history, foreign policy and 
diplomacy will find this report of interest, we hope that practitioners and 
diplomats will equally find it of use. We have sought to simplify the basic 
negotiating lines in the hope of revealing where opportunities and 
challenges might lie going forward. Whatever the outcome of the current 
Trump–Kim negotiating cycle, international relations scholars and think 
tank policy analysts must continue to look at the art of negotiation as a 
means of talking our way to peace. 
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1. NORTH KOREA’S NEGOTIATING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES   
 
“As I walked over here, I thought ‘why was it so difficult to get here?’ The 
separating line wasn’t even that high to cross. It was too easy to walk over 
that line and it took us 11 years to get here.” 
~Kim Jong-un, Panmunjom Peace Summit.  
27 April 2018 
 
What does North Korea want ultimately? This continues to be a major point 
of contention among North Korea experts in Northeast Asia and the West. 
Is it unification? Or perhaps merely regime survival? Or is it as grandiose as 
an expulsion of US forces from the Korean Peninsula? According to the 
discussions among our expert panel, the motivations for North Korean 
leaders are not dissimilar to the options of other states in the international 
system: to maximise gains and minimise losses. During discussions at the 
round table, it was agreed that the North Korean leadership has come to 
the table with the Trump administration partly because of the maximum 
pressure – economic and military – imposed on it by the USA, and partly 
because it has achieved a nuclear deterrent and now feels in a stronger 
position to negotiate with the USA. As a result, it seems to be taking the 
negotiating process seriously, while simultaneously playing a number of 
other strategies, including developing support from Russia and China, 
attempting to water down international support for sanctions, and spinning 
out negotiations for as long as possible. The primary question for Seoul and 
Washington at the moment is how sincere is in this situation? Is it really 
willing to trade normalisation, peace and economic growth for its nuclear 
arsenal, or does it wish to have its cake and eat it? 
 
What Does North Korea Want? 
The primary goals of the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-un have 
fluctuated, making it difficult to answer this question. Certainly, the Five 
Conditions for Denuclearization policy made in Rodong Sinmun1 in July 
2016 seemed to be an expanded notion of the North Korean definition of 
denuclearisation. In short order Pyongyang declared it wanted: (i) a US 
declaration of all nuclear weapons in the South; (ii) complete, verifiable and 
irreversible denuclearisation in South Korea; (iii) a withdrawal of the US 
nuclear umbrella from the Korean Peninsula; (iv) guarantees from the USA 
that it would never use nuclear weapons on the Peninsula; and (v) a gradual 
withdrawal of US forces from the Peninsula. It is difficult to know how fixed 
these goals are, given that a withdrawal of US troops and the US nuclear 
                                                          
 
1 The official North Korean newspaper of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea. 
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umbrella from South Korea would be a non-starter in Washington.2 Indeed, 
recent reports indicate that Kim does not consider withdrawal of US forces 
from the Peninsula a non-negotiable issue.3 
Certainly, whatever the current state of the North Korean stated goals, our 
round table agreed that its permanent goals are regime survival and 
economic development, ideally on its own terms. In March 2013, Kim Jong-
un announced his Byungjin policy, a parallel advance of economic growth 
and nuclear capabilities. On 20 April this year, he announced a victory of 
the nuclear path and declared a new strategic line of “economy first” at a 
Worker’s Party plenum.4 Kim showed that he wants not only aid but also 
investment. His willingness to highlight Singapore’s economic development 
could be seen in the 42-minute documentary film of the summit, in which 
the city played an unusually large role in the background of Kim’s visit. 
Though a capitalist nation, Singapore was lauded in the film as “clean, 
beautiful and advanced”5, indicating that Kim is serious about economic 
reforms. 
North Korea also craves legitimacy as the “real” Korea and desires 
international status. In the first instance, its desire to be accepted by the 
international community like its southern neighbour plays into the complex 
dynamics between the two. In terms of status, its nuclear weapons 
programme fulfils this to some extent. First, it is a source of regime security 
and survival. Second, it is a source of diplomatic leverage over Washington 
and other regional actors. Third, it has given Pyongyang the type of global 
status that it might not have otherwise achieved.  
Ultimately, this complex mixture of roles for nuclear weapons on the Korean 
Peninsula means that Pyongyang is going to try to draw out any removal 
process of its nuclear weapons in order to avoid losing security and 
maintain negotiating leverage. North Korea’s sweet spot will be in 
maintaining the systems for as long as possible, while maintaining the 
momentum of the process and keeping Washington at the table. It would 
therefore seem that what is required is a guarantee that it will not be 
attacked and direct negotiations with the United States.   
                                                          
 
2 Fifield, A., ‘North Korea’s definition of “denuclearization” is very different from Trump’s’, The Washington 
Post, 9 April 2018. 
3 Landler, M. and Choe Sang-Hun, ‘North Korea Drops Troop Demand, but U.S. Reacts Warily, The New York 
Times, 19 April 2018. 
4 Carlin, R., ‘Kim Jong Un’s New Strategic Line’, 38 North, 23 April 2018. 
5 Shin, H., “North Korean film on Kim’s Singapore trip reveals new focus on economy”, Reuters, 15 June, 2018 
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Achieving its Objectives 
For Kim Jong-un, the nuclear weapons 
programme has meant a form of security from 
the USA and the rest of the world. It is an 
advanced bargaining tool that applies an 
effective deterrent against all who wish to 
unseat the regime. To get rid of his nuclear 
weapons would be to get rid of his security 
and stability. He wants to keep his nuclear 
weapons as long as possible and he will not 
give them up unless he obtains an ironclad 
security guarantee (complete, verifiable and 
irreversible security, or CVIS), along with 
other material benefits.  
In terms of signs that North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear weapons, 
the Panmunjom Declaration indicates a willingness by both sides to carry 
out military disarmament, build a peace regime and realise “through 
complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula”. It also agreed 
to “actively seek the support and cooperation of the international 
community for the denuclearization for the Korean Peninsula” .6  
It has sought to soften tensions with the United States by making 
concessions while simultaneously making new requests. For example, Kim 
Jong-un has released the remains of 55 US soldiers missing in action during 
the Korean War (1950–1953), has shut down its nuclear test site at Punggye-
ri7 and has begun to dismantle its Sohae missile launch site.8 However, it 
has also insisted that it will halt all progress on the denuclearisation issue 
until a “bold move” is made to agree a new peace treaty. This is problematic 
for the USA as it would require two-thirds of the US Senate in addition, 
leading to a possible movement inside the USA to unilaterally withdraw 
troops from the Korean Peninsula. Any agreement would also affect the UN 
presence there, requiring the UN to be brought into the peace process as 
well as perhaps ending the official reason for UN support to South Korea. 
Then there is the issue of North Korea’s agreement to denuclearisation on 
the Korean Peninsula. According to some accounts, this is a drive to set the 
entire relationship with the USA on a new track, and perhaps even engage 
with it at the expense of Sino–North Korean relations. According to Peter 
Hayes, the director of the Nautilus Institute, Pyongyang would seek a 
                                                          
 
6 ‘Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula’, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Republic of Korea), 27 April 2018, available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;s
rchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&
page=1&titleNm=, last visited: 10 September 2018. 
7 Fifield, A., ‘North Korea says it will suspend nuclear and missile tests’, The Washington Post, 20 April 2018. 
8 Sevastopulo, D. and Song Jung-a, ‘North Korea is dismantling nuclear arsenal – or is it?’, Financial Times, 24 
July 2018. 
 
To get rid of his nuclear 
weapons would be to 
get rid of his security 
and stability. He wants to 
keep his nuclear 
weapons as long as 
possible and he will not 
give them up unless he 
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security guarantee. 
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nuclear-free Peninsula (including South Korea) to create a new 
collaborative relationship with the USA. While this sounds odd, there may 
be a certain logic to upgrading ties with the USA, given Beijing’s own 
regional ambitions to influence the Peninsula.  
Summary 
It is unclear what the North Koreans gave away at the summit, but it seems 
as if all parties – including the Trump administration – agreed that 
immediate denuclearisation will not take place in the short term. In many 
ways, the summit was a win for North Korea in the sense that it achieved a 
vague, general, highly symbolic agreement, which it might now seek to spin 
out for as long as possible. The inconclusive visit by Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo seems to be an example of this, with one White House source 
telling a news agency, “The North Koreans were just messing around, not 
serious about moving forward.” This ambiguity has continued in the wake 
of the summit as North Korea has dismantled its missile site at Sohae9 while 
constructing new liquid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles.10 
However, it is also clear from the behaviour of Kim Jong-un that something 
has changed from previous cycles of provocation, crisis and negotiation. 
First of all, it would appear that something has shifted in terms of North 
Korea’s priorities. One might see this in the fact that after North Korean 
diplomats stood up the US team in Singapore for a pre-summit meeting, 
Trump cancelled the summit, citing Pyongyang’s “tremendous anger and 
open hostility”. Surprisingly, North Korea did an “about-face” on its rhetoric 
and attempted to reset the summit meeting with the US President. This 
might have been to gain the diplomatic victory of a meeting with the US 
President, but it is also highly likely that Kim Jong-un was genuinely worried 
about a US military build-up and is sincere in wanting to develop North 
Korea’s economy, using the nuclear weapons programme as a bargaining 
chip. In this instance, it would appear as though North Korea’s state 
messaging to its own domestic audience has begun to adjust the new 
prioritisation of economic growth.  
There are thus two real questions ahead of us. First, can the USA and North 
Korea agree on an incremental deal, involving North Korean CVID for 
normalisation and economic development? Second, can such a deal be 
verified, given the technical difficulties involved in tracking North Korea’s 
nuclear plutonium stockpile? This verification issue is precisely what ended 
up stalling the Six-Party Talks process in 2007. 
 
                                                          
 
9 Taylor, A., ‘North Korea begins dismantling key test site, satellite imagery suggests’, The Washington Post, 23 
July 2018. 
10 Brunnstrom, D., ‘US detects new activity at North Korea factory that built ICBMs’, Reuters, 31 July 2018.  
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2. THE USA’S NEGOTIATING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES       
 
“I just think that we are now going to start the process of denuclearization 
of North Korea, and I believe that he’s going back and it will start virtually 
immediately – and he’s already indicated that and you look at what he’s 
done.” 
~President Donald J Trump, Singapore 
12 June 2018 
 
US diplomacy under President Donald Trump is historically atypical and 
does not fall easily into the traditions of past US administrations. While 
North Korea has long been lauded as “unpredictable” in the Western media, 
our panel of experts agreed that Trump represents a special case of 
American unpredictability. While many of the USA’s aims and objectives 
have remained the same, the negotiating positions and style have shifted, 
with many debating whether the Trump administration presents a complete 
break from the past or a form of continuity with stylistic differences. Indeed, 
there are many who are unsure whether the ultimate strategic aims of 
maintaining and consolidating the US alliance system in Asia remain a 
priority to the administration owing to Trump’s harsh rhetoric on the costs 
of alliances to the US taxpayer. 
What Does the USA Want? 
The USA’s position has long been to get North Korea to agree to complete, 
verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation (CVID) – even if, it should be noted, 
the Singapore Declaration and subsequent statements have not made 
specific reference to it. In return, it has been willing to offer North Korea 
diplomatic normalisation, economic incentives and various aid packages. 
This has been no different under Trump, though perhaps it is not yet clear 
whether a removal of US troops from the Peninsula would ever be 
considered, given the President’s statements on the matter. His strategy 
has been driven by maximum pressure and maximum engagement. The 
maximum pressure sanctions approach has been a continuation of the 
groundwork laid by the Obama Administration.11 It was the Obama 
Administration, after all, that prepared many of the early sanctions 
packages that the newly elected Trump administration utilised in the early 
part of 2017. Having said that, there are key differences between the Obama 
administration’s “strategic patience” approach – critiqued by many as 
“doing nothing” – and the Trump administration’s approach. This can be 
seen in the heavy involvement of the executive, something particular to 
Trump’s personal approach. Then there has been the scope and type of 
pressure put on North Korea, including heavy diplomatic and military 
                                                          
 
11 Klimas, J., ‘Trump’s North Korea strategy: A lot like Obama’s’, Politco, 8 August 2018. 
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pressure. Keeping military options on the table and moving various military 
assets such as B2 and B52 bombers and aircraft carriers will have played a 
role.12 There has also been the Trump administration’s willingness to 
pressure Beijing directly, shaping international public opinion and imposing 
secondary sanctions, such as those on Chinese companies.  
The primary tool has been sanctions, and one can see that there are 
similarities between the administration’s application of sanctions on North 
Korea and pressure on Iran. Indeed, the types of sanctions on Iran are very 
similar to the sanctions implemented on North Korea, and there seems to 
be a learning curve in how they achieve their best effects with the two 
regimes. One main difference between North Korean sanctions and the 
Iranian sanctions is that the North Korean sanctions were implemented 
unilaterally and through the UN, while those on Iran were implemented 
unilaterally and through multilateral coalitions. Every time there is a major 
provocation by North Korea the USA calls for new sanctions at the United 
Nations. New sanctions have been introduced by the Administration almost 
every month, except for July of 2017. In addition, Trump has made sure that 
others implemented these economic sanctions by using American influence 
abroad.  
Achieving its Objectives 
As has become evident, Trump brings heavy 
personal involvement to US diplomacy, whether 
through the promotion of his policies on Twitter or 
through summitry. As mentioned above, the key 
points of Trump’s strategy thus far have been to 
apply maximum pressure on the economic and 
military fronts, through tougher sanctions 
packages and the movement of key US military 
assets to the regional theatre, creating a threat 
perception within North Korean leadership, all the 
while keeping an open face to negotiations. 
Perhaps the most revolutionary approach utilised 
by the President was his willingness to use the 
threat of a conflict to persuade both Pyongyang 
and Beijing that he was serious. He has followed 
this military pressure by applying unprecedented 
sanctions on a number of Russian13 and Chinese14 financial institutions that 
carried out business with North Korea, and he used the pressure of 
international public opinion through Twitter to shame Chinese sanctions 
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busting.15 There are those who criticise him for having a strong desire for 
an image of grand deal-making at the expense of substance. This desire for 
spectacle and the need for the appearance of the grand bargain have been 
both a strength and a weakness to the administration’s approach. On the 
one hand, it makes the White House extremely flexible and open to 
meetings, as evidenced by Trump’s sudden willingness for North Korea to 
take part in the 2018 Winter Olympics, as one example. This same 
dynamism ensured that even after the communications failures of his team 
(invoking the “Libya Model”) and the no-show by North Korea’s pre-summit 
team in Singapore, Trump was able to cancel the meeting and then 
reinstate it.  
However, critics and members outside of Trump’s base note that neither of 
the agreements made by North Korea at Panmunjom or in Singapore was 
markedly different from those that came before, such as the 2000 Joint 
Communique.16 Similar to this document, the Panmunjom Declaration and 
the USA–North Korea Joint Statement agreed that North Korea would 
commit to denuclearisation, and that all sides would push for a peace 
treaty. Neither document gave concrete details on a process, however, and 
remained ambiguous in nature. 
In return for North Korea’s willingness to come to the table, the USA has 
offered a number of concessions, such as putting a freeze on all bilateral 
military training exercises with the South Korean military, raising the 
possibility of the easing of sanctions, and offering a reconstruction and 
development package.17 While this first move – a seemingly off-the-cuff 
move by President Trump in the wake of the Singapore Summit – was 
widely welcomed among progressives in South Korea, it caused some 
concern among US and South Korean military officials.18 It also impacted 
perceptions of US alliance reliability among regional political elites. While 
the offer of sanctions was made by Secretary of State Pompeo on his visit 
to Pyongyang, he was accused of making “gangster demands” after he left 
North Korea, and the North Koreans put forward the notion of a freeze on 
denuclearisation until a peace treaty is realised.  
It is thought that President Trump will not hesitate to negotiate for the 
USA’s narrow interests, and though he has publicly reassured Japan that 
the abductions issue will be examined, it is clear that denuclearisation has 
been prioritised. For South Korea, avoiding the military option and 
maintaining the North–South Relationship – perhaps even bringing control 
                                                          
 
15 ‘North Korea: Trump accuses China of allowing oil transfers’, BBC News, 29 December 2017. 
16 For example, Boot, M., ‘A summit without substance’, The Washington Post, 12 June 2018; Hemmings, J. and 
James Amedeo, ‘Ambiguity the only certainty as the dust settles on the Singapore Summit’, East Asia Forum, 17 
June 2018; Panda, A., ‘Trump’s Singapore Summit was a bust – for the US’, Daily Beast, 12 June 2018. 
17 ‘US offers North Korea new deal to reconstruct if it scraps nuclear weapons programme’, ITV News, 12 May 
2018. 
18 Smith, J. and Phil Stewart, ‘Trump surprises with pledge to end military exercises in South Korea’, Reuters, 12 
June 2018. 
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back to Koreans – has raised the possibility of a clash between Moon and 
Trump. However, as the next chapter will show, both Moon and Trump have 
managed to work around their different approaches and interests on the 
North Korea issue. 
Summary  
The ideal scenario for the USA would be the CVID of North Korea and the 
securing of all nuclear technologies before any easing of sanctions takes 
place. This preference can be seen in various statements made by the 
Trump administration and in the secondary sanctions that have been 
applied to those Chinese and Russian companies that have sought to 
facilitate trade with North Korea.19 The ideal result would be for the USA to 
accomplish North Korea’s CVID with little or no impact on the US alliance 
system.20 However, it should be noted that there are differences on this 
between the Washington foreign policy establishment and the President 
with regard to maintaining some sort of US presence on the Korean 
Peninsula even after a grand deal were to be struck. Trump’s approach 
towards alliances has often been either indifferent or harshly critical of their 
costs to the US taxpayer. Because of his America First approach, it is 
difficult to know whether the USA would seek to create a new regional 
balance or a sub-regional security system through such negotiations. Such 
speculations are increasingly difficult given the growing Sino–US trade 
tensions.  
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3. SOUTH KOREA’S AIMS AND OBJECTIVES      
 
“The message we must send to North Korea is twofold: if the North Korean 
regime believes that it can defend and protect itself through nuclear and 
missile programs, that is a misjudgement. But if North Korea gives up its 
nuclear program, we will help it secure and develop itself. We must 
consistently send these two messages.” 
~President Moon Jae-in 
April 2018 
 
South Korea really has been a catalyst for the diplomacy that has taken 
place over the past year. It has consistently served as a middle path for the 
North Korean and American leadership, and drawn both together, even 
when the two pulled away from each other sharply.21 There was agreement 
among our discussion panel that the Nobel Peace Prize might be awarded 
to President Moon Jae-in, rather than President Trump, as the South Korean 
leader played such a personal role in changing the tone of US–North Korean 
tensions. Given Moon’s background (he was aide to progressive President 
Roh Moo-hyun, his parents were from North Korea and he was born in a 
South Korean refugee camp), his strong positioning has come off as sincere 
and resonated well with the South Korean electorate. President Moon 
seems to understand the costs of war because he has experienced them. 
Furthermore, compared to other South Korean Presidents, Moon has 
attempted diplomacy with the North early in his presidency. Given that 
South Korean Presidents only sit for one term of five years, this has given 
him added authority going forward.22 
What Does South Korea Want? 
To some extent, South Korea’s approach towards North Korea diverges 
between its progressive and conservative factions, depending on which 
type of political leader is in office. As Moon is broadly speaking a 
progressive leader from the left, his positioning is fairly liberal in approach 
and he has followed in the footsteps of previous liberal presidents, such as 
Dim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008). He 
emphasises peace processes with the North over security, economic 
engagement and trust-building, and has made statements that would 
indicate an interest in a new type of “Sunshine policy”, involving greater 
cultural, people-to-people and economic ties.23 Having said that, he came 
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into office wanting a few things that are particular to his own political 
trajectory and experience.  
First, Moon wants a peace process with North Korea, in order to bring a 
symbolic end to the conflict. Second, he wishes to do that with US support. 
Despite the traditional distrust felt by the left for the USA inside South 
Korean political discourse, Moon has seen up close how little Seoul can do 
without US support. He was Roh Moo-hyun’s chief of staff and observed the 
payoffs between criticising the USA publicly to appease the progressive 
base and being blocked by the White House. He is determined not to repeat 
Roh’s mistakes vis-à-vis the USA and has made sure to cater to President 
Trump publicly and behind the scenes. Third, Moon wants CVID on the 
Korean Peninsula. Fourth, Moon wants to repair North–South relations 
through revived people-to-people contact and through revived economic 
ties.  
Achieving its Objectives 
Realising after his electoral victory that North Korea’s international 
reputation had sunk to new lows – in the wake of further missile tests and 
the assassination of Kim – South Korean leader Moon Jae-in has been 
extremely pragmatic. Rather than moving against the tide of public opinion 
and against the inclinations of a hawkish approach from the Trump 
Administration, Moon has played for time and sought to coordinate closely 
with the White House from the outset. In many ways, he has sought to cater 
to President Trump’s need for symbolic wins, and often credited Trump for 
political victories that he might have claimed for himself.24  
However, President Moon has limits on what he can achieve. Kim or Trump 
could cancel any future talks without warning. Moon has suggested that all 
parties, including Russia and Japan, have to be included in the peace treaty 
in order to form a long-lasting peace. It is difficult to know how that might 
take place, but if he is able to obtain American and Chinese support, it 
should not present too much of a problem. President Moon wants a peace 
treaty to officially end the Korean War, North Korea to ultimately 
denuclearise and, in the long term, to have United Nations inspectors inside 
North Korea. President Trump shares the interest in denuclearisation, as 
discussed above, but it is difficult to know his position with regard to 
continued US military presence on the Peninsula after any successful CVID. 
No doubt, one of Moon’s major tasks will be to balance US unilateralism on 
the future of the alliance, and he will seek to maintain sufficiently healthy 
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relations with Japan25 and the shifting wartime operational control to Korea 
– a thorn which has long been in the side of the alliance.26 
According to one account,27 aides around Moon Jae-
in have suggested a number of trust-building ways to 
drive US–North Korean negotiations forward, 
including a “years-long process of reciprocal 
exchanges involving nuclear concessions from North 
Korea and political, security, and economic 
concessions from the United States and its partners”. 
The best path would be if US investors and officials 
were to begin working in North Korea, to create 
incentives for the North and reassure it 
simultaneously. In August 2018, Moon Jae-in put 
forward a railway project as a start for “prosperity”, 
which he insists will be tied to denuclearisation. As 
sanctions forbid this type of project, Moon has found 
his proposal buffeted by signs of opposition from 
Washington.28 
Summary 
Like the USA, the ideal scenario for South Korea would be CVID. However, 
it should be noted that, owing to his progressive politics, the Moon 
administration will also seek to develop North Korea’s economy and build 
closer political ties between Seoul and Pyongyang – something that 
appears to be already occurring29 – which will run into opposition from the 
Trump Administration over the easing of sanctions.  
In many ways, South Korea has the most difficult tasks, given that it has to 
attempt to manage great power relations with the USA and China,30 while 
attempting to put the process for any future inter-Korean peace process 
into Korean hands. The trick will be balancing all of this with the assurances 
that North Korea needs, the verification issue for the Americans, the 
regional leadership concerns of Chinese and the abductees issue for the 
Japanese. Finally, there are always the Russians, who will need to have a 
role, if only to prevent them from taking an opportunistic spoiling role over 
the crisis. Moon will also have to strike a balance between those on the 
conservative side of Korea’s political spectrum who wish to maintain a 
strong alliance and military-to-military links with the United States in the 
                                                          
 
25 Cha, V. D., Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
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foreseeable future, and those progressives who view any CVID process as 
a means of potentially removing US forces from the Peninsula.  
 
4. CHINA’S NEGOTIATING AIMS AND OBJECTIVES     
 
“We are happy to see that the DPRK made a major decision to shift the 
focus to economic construction, and the development of the DPRK’s 
socialist cause has entered a new stage in history … Comrade Chairman has 
made positive efforts for realizing denuclearization and maintaining peace 
on the peninsula.” 
~President Xi Jinping, meeting Kim Jong-un,  
Beijing, 20 June 2018 
 
While China has not been involved in this era of negotiations, it has played 
a major role in the background, receiving three visits from North Korea’s 
leader, Kim Jong-un. Overall, China has a complex role in the North Korean 
crisis and acts as an “honest broker” in attempting to bring the USA and 
North Korea together, while maintaining close political ties to Pyongyang 
and China’s only formal alliance. China was the first country in Asia to 
acquire nuclear weapons. Its interest in acquiring them started in the 1950s 
after the USA’s involvement in the Taiwan Straits. In the next decade, it 
would achieve its goal, with its first detonation in 1964. Seeing the impact 
on Beijing’s hard power and regional standing, North Korean interest 
developed from that time. Only the top-tier powers had nuclear weapons, 
and only nuclear weapons could lead to the North becoming a great power. 
Thus, as it began to fall behind in the expensive conventional arms race in 
the 1980s, North Korea began to allocate a significant portion of its GDP 
and human capital to its nuclear ambitions, ultimately leading to its first 
successful test on 9 October 2006.  
While Beijing has long been North Korea’s main trading partner and military 
ally (“as close as lips to teeth”, as the saying goes), it has viewed North 
Korea’s nuclear programme with ambiguity. Traditionally, Chinese foreign 
policy elites did not openly debate North Korea’s nuclear programme, but 
after the crisis in 1994, when the USA began to consider military options, 
splits in the party position began to appear. Broadly speaking, the Chinese 
policy community is divided into three camps on how it thinks about the 
North Korean issue. First, there are traditionalists in the CCP who believe 
that North Korea is a strategic asset created at the expense of enormous 
human sacrifice during the Korean War and that its nuclear weapons are 
symptomatic of the post-Cold War imbalance of power on the Korean 
Peninsula. Second, there are strategists who believe that China should 
support the USA’s efforts to denuclearise North Korea because they see 
that a rogue regime with nuclear weapons is destabilising for the region 
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and a threat to Chinese growth. Finally, there are centrists who take the 
middle ground on the North Korean issue and believe that support for 
denuclearisation efforts is important as long as it doesn’t threaten the North 
Korean regime. The current government under Xi Jinping is considered by 
our expert panel to be a centrist one.   
What Does China Want? 
Prior to the Trump Administration, the US policy community debated 
whether China was really implanting sanctions, or whether it was in fact 
unable to apply too much pressure on North Korea. A common response to 
US efforts to persuade China to apply more pressure on North Korea was 
that, first, Pyongyang did not take direction from China and, second, too 
much pressure might destabilise the regime. At the beginning of the Trump 
administration, however, it was clear that there was widespread belief 
among the US policy community31 that North Korea was getting a free ride 
through China. To some extent, North Korea’s economic growth reflected 
this, as it saw a robust growth rate of 4% in 2016, with 90% of that activity 
taking place across the Chinese border. While it’s not clear that China has 
intentionally broken sanctions, a UN report found that various individuals 
and entities from China had helped create an elaborate infrastructure of 
skeleton shipping companies to engage in sanctioned trade and financial 
dealings.32 Beijing has traditionally played a role in delaying or softening 
overly harsh sanctions packages, such as those devised during the George 
W. Bush Administration.33 
Prior to Trump’s inauguration, Beijing’s primary policy line was to suggest 
a resurrection of the Six-Party Talks. The idea was not without merit, since 
it was the closest the region had come to resolving the North Korean 
nuclear issue when talks ceased in late 2007. In essence, the issue that had 
broken the talks was the inability of the USA and North Korea to agree to a 
verification protocol. By the end of 2008, North Korea had restarted its 
programme, and in 2010 revealed a light water reactor uranium enrichment 
facility.34 Following that period, Beijing began to recommend a “freeze-for-
freeze” approach, which would see North Korea freeze its programme and 
testing in exchange for a freeze of annual US–South Korean military 
exercises.35 
In their telephone conversation in April 2017, President Xi Jinping told 
President Trump that China was “committed to the target of 
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denuclearization on the Peninsula, safeguarding peace and stability on the 
Peninsula, and advocates resolving problems through peaceful means” .36 
This inner foreign policy group has stated that it wants North Korea to 
denuclearise peacefully, as it realises that a war on the Korean Peninsula 
would be more disastrous than a Kim Jong-un regime with nuclear 
weapons. China would be faced with serious economic and security 
problems and its peaceful rise would be threatened. 
China’s immediate goal has been to help bring about 
an end to the nuclear tests and it is credited37 for really 
putting pressure on cross-border trade, particularly 
after the USA sanctioned Chinese banks serving North 
Korean government officials. For the moment, they 
seem to have achieved this goal, though perhaps less 
from exerting pressure and more because Pyongyang 
appears to have achieved the results it wanted. Xi 
made a point to Kim that they cannot be defended if 
they continue their nuclear tests.38 Kim realises that 
China is North Korea’s strongest ally and that when Xi 
talks Kim must listen – or at least pretend that he does, 
since Kim had a poor relationship with China from his 
inauguration until earlier this year. The recent thaw in 
Sino–North Korean relations is more than “lips being close to teeth” – as 
the old adage goes – and more a question of pure calculations about China’s 
potential economic support, its military power and North Korea’s possible 
reliance on both. 
Achieving its Objectives 
China has revealed itself to have great leverage in shaping North Korean 
behaviour; much of this stems from Pyongyang’s economic reliance on 
Beijing. Chinese diplomats regularly encourage Kim to switch his focus from 
nuclear development to economic development, promising that its 
inclusion in Beijing’s massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) would be a key 
accelerant for North Korea’s reconstruction and development process. 
While there have been major concerns about development debt in the 
West,39 the BRI has been touted by Beijing as offering infrastructure 
projects and other benefits to those who sign up. In developing countries, 
the economic benefits appear to have delivered a number of key projects 
important to national economies. For example, in Pakistan the construction 
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of the Nehru Tim Jigelu Mu Hydropower Station40 helped solve a key energy 
deficit. Kim Jong-un must realise this and must have considered inclusion. 
Chinese public opinion differs quite widely over North Korea. For example, 
older generations are more likely to be supportive of the country, while 
younger generations are more critical. In 2016 a survey conducted by 
Weibo on social media asked 8,000 Chinese citizens whether they would 
be in favour of a US pre-emptive strike on North Korean nuclear weapon 
sites. Astonishingly, two-thirds responded that they would be in favour of 
such strikes. While Weibo constituency reflects its urban, middle-class 
roots, the fact that this poll was so overwhelmingly in favour of strikes on 
a Chinese ally must have been disconcerting for China’s leadership. 
Summary 
The best possible outcome for China would be if North Korea and the USA 
were to normalise their relations and establish a peace regime on the 
Korean Peninsula. If North Korea were to back down from its constant 
provocations and the United States were to match concrete steps to 
denuclearise with a softening of maximum pressure (this would include the 
reprieve of sanctions), then relations would go back to the status quo. 
China could then keep its client state – and, more importantly, its buffer 
from a US ally on its border – and focus its energy on other parts of the 
world, working on building a regional hegemony in the Asian theatre. 
Certainly, it would like to develop closer economic ties with North Korea – 
first, as it is said to have vast mineral deposits useful to China’s economy, 
and second, as linking them into the Belt and Road Initiative would enable 
some leverage over what has long been a wilful and at times petulant ally. 
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5. JAPAN’S AIMS AND OBJECTIVES       
 
“Efforts toward dialogue were used to buy time. We must make North 
Korea abandon all nuclear and ballistic missile use in a complete, verifiable, 
and irreversible manner. If North Korea does not accept that, then I am 
convinced there is no way forward other than to continue to maximize the 
pressure on it using every possible means. And, we will demonstrate 
leadership within the international community and make our utmost efforts 
toward resolving the abduction issue.” 
~Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Election Victory Speech,  
September 2017 
 
Japan has become increasingly marginalised in the crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula. Certainly, it appears that Japan has been left out of the 
negotiations between the US President and the North Korean leader, Kim 
Jong-un. Certainly it has not played a direct role, and Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe has had to resort to a secondary role, consulting with 
the US President in Washington DC the week before Trump’s summit 
meeting with Kim in Singapore.41 However, despite the appearance of being 
left outside the loop, Japan does have a number of points upon which it can 
exert leverage, including its own unilateral sanctions packages, the 
potential for future Japan–North Korean economic activity and investment, 
and its place as a US ally. 
What Does Japan Want? 
During his brief remarks in the Rose Garden of the White House five days 
before Trump’s trip to Singapore, the Japanese Prime Minister made two 
points. The first was to remind the world of the fate of Megumi Yokota, a 
young girl who was abducted at the age of 13 by North Korean agents from 
her town in 1977. Abe pronounced that he wished to negotiate directly with 
the North, determined to take all means. The second point he made was to 
link the abductions issues to Japan’s support for UN Security Council 
resolutions (sanctions), and to offer a promise of Japanese economic help 
if the issue were to be resolved. “If North Korea is willing to take steps 
toward the right direction, North Korea can see a bright future for itself. 
Japan … is prepared to settle the unfortunate past, to normalize our 
diplomatic relations, and to provide economic cooperation.”  
From this we can see that the issue has huge resonance at the domestic 
level inside Japan. Indeed, Prime Minister Abe actually came to national 
prominence as a young Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet member after 
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adopting a hard-line stance on the North Korean abductions issue and as a 
key negotiator on the issue for the Koizumi government. The issue has its 
roots in the 1970s and 1980s, when the North Korean intelligence services 
abducted a number of Japanese citizens to us them for cultural and 
language training. In September 2002 the North Korean government 
released five of the abductees and issued the Pyongyang declaration which 
stated that North Korea would halt its nuclear programme in return for 
economic aid from Japan.42 Even though the abductions occurred nearly 
four decades ago, the Japanese people have not forgotten about the 
remaining abductees. This means that the primary objective for Abe is 
different from most of the other countries’ objectives. 
While most of the other countries believe that 
denuclearisation is the most important 
objective, Prime Minister Abe believes that the 
return of the remaining abductees is the 
primary objective of negotiations. So important 
is the issue to Abe that he sought and received 
a commitment from Trump at the Mar-a-Lago 
resort that Trump would raise the issue of 
Japanese nationals in his meeting with Kim.43 
While it is unclear whether or not the issue was 
raised in their discussions, the issue was not 
included in the Singapore Declaration. It has 
been reported that in the recent string of 
meetings between Pompeo and North Korean 
interlocutors, Pompeo has brought up the 
abduction issue. According to Japanese media accounts, Kim 
acknowledged the issue but did not make any definitive statements in 
regard to the resolution.44  
Achieving its Objectives 
Japan’s method of incentivising North Korea to resolve the abductees issue 
satisfactorily has been threefold. First, it holds some leverage over 
multilateral sanctions in the United Nations. Second, it has its own sanctions 
on North Korea, which it can offer to lift. Third, it can offer “compensation” 
to North Korea in the form of economic aid and investment, once a peace 
treaty and CVID have been realised. This last promise has to some extent 
depended on the success it has had in carrying out such a policy with South 
Korea. In 1965, when the two countries normalised relations, they agreed 
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that Japan would pay a fund of $300 million to Seoul, while extending a 
further $200 million in loans. To some extent, though it was never stated, 
this was owing to Japan’s colonial past over the Korean Peninsula and is an 
unacknowledged form of reparations. Over the past 40 years, the two have 
grown closer economically, with Japan now accounting for the third largest 
share of South Korea’s trade. Furthermore, an additional 40,000 Japanese 
citizens live in South Korea. 
While Japan’s stated objective is to offer economic incentives in exchange 
for North Korea to release any remaining abductees, it has been some time 
since the issue has garnered a positive response from North Korea. Since 
2005, Pyongyang has insisted that the issue is dead, when it returned 
cremated remains to Japan, and in 2002 it allowed five living victims to 
visit relatives in Japan on the condition that they return to North Korea. 
Their subsequent decision to remain in Japan closed the issue – and some 
argue became an excuse – for Pyongyang to close the issue. Subsequently, 
Tokyo has continued to demand evidence of the fate of the remaining eight 
victims and challenged the veracity of those remains brought to Japan. 
Thus, aside from this promise of future aid, Tokyo has little leverage over 
the negotiations. Thus it has devoted a large part of its strategy attempting 
to influence public opinion inside the West, pressing the USA to adopt the 
issue and relying on economic sticks to bring Pyongyang back to the table. 
Summary  
Abe will continue to push the abductees issue with the USA and South 
Korea, and link it to denuclearisation. He may even hold back Japanese 
support for sanctions relief and a regional peace treaty in order to influence 
future negotiations. If Abe engages in talks and achieves the return of the 
remaining abductees, it would have a significant impact on the domestic 
scene in Japan.  
The Japanese people are still in shock that President Trump started 
negotiations with Pyongyang – the same shock that occurred in 1971 when 
Richard Nixon visited China – and are not really sure how they feel. They 
want peace in the Peninsula, but not if that means the great powers forget 
about the abductees. Abe’s best course of action would be to not rush to a 
conclusion but to wait and see what Pyongyang wants from Tokyo, after 
which Abe can negotiate from that baseline offer.  
The ideal situation for Tokyo would be the return of the abductees, peace 
in the Peninsula and reunification of North and South Korea. In order to 
properly do this, the main short-term goal is to gain access to the 
negotiating table. In the current cycle of USA–North Korean negotiations, 
Abe will look to convince Trump that Japan’s support will be needed in 
future economic packages to the North, and that Pyongyang and 
Washington cannot ignore Tokyo forever in brokering a peace deal. 
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6. RUSSIA’S AIMS AND OBJECTIVES          
 
“They’d rather eat grass than abandon their [nuclear weapons] programme 
unless they feel secure. And what can establish security? The restoration of 
international law. We should promote dialogue among all interested 
parties.” 
~President Vladimir Putin, BRICS Summit  
September 2017   
 
As far back as the 1990s, Russia’s marginalisation as a player in the first 
nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula provoked deep bitterness among 
Russian policy elites, but with this resentment came the realisation that 
Moscow’s lack of a clear policy and lack of investment into either of the 
Koreas was also to blame for the loss of influence. Subsequently, Russia has 
conducted a more balanced policy, preparing perhaps for a unified Korea 
that might be persuaded to invest more heavily in the Russian Far East 
(RFE). How much leverage this “balanced policy” affords Moscow is unclear 
as the past cycle of four-way discussions has seen both Russia and Japan 
excluded from most of the direct negotiations. Thus one might look at 
Moscow’s “balanced policy” as having primarily benefitted Beijing. Since 
this last cycle of negotiations began, it’s clear that Russia has been 
attempting to influence the discussions. There are rumours that North 
Korea’s leader may have been invited to the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization Summit in Qingdao,45 to meet with both President Putin and 
President Xi on the sidelines, though this remains unconfirmed. Most 
recently, Putin has invited Kim Jong-un to visit Vladivostok in September 
2018 to attend the Eastern Economic Forum.46 
What Does Russia Want? 
The Korean Peninsula has begun to take an increasingly central role in 
Russia’s Asian diplomacy, and since the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, bilateral 
relations between Russia and North Korea have become more active. Like 
China, Russia has generally been reluctant to strengthen sanctions on 
Pyongyang, although the interests of China and Russia do not necessarily 
always coincide.   
Russia’s interest in North Korea is threefold. First, although Russia has only 
a short border with North Korea, a regime collapse scenario47 there would 
have devastating effects on the RFE in terms of refugee flows. For now, 
North Korea provides a steady flow of labour for the RFE, in particular in 
                                                          
 
45 Chossudovsky, M., ‘Qingdao SCO Summit: “Secret Meeting” between Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Kim 
Jong-un?’, Global Research, 31 May 2018. 
46 ‘Putin invited North Korea’s Kim to visit in Russia in September – RIA’, Reuters, 4 June 2018. 
47 O’Hanlon, M. E., ‘North Korea Collapse Scenarios’, Brookings Institution, 9 June 2009. 
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the logging industry.48 Second, Russia is interested in the economic 
possibilities in North Korea, both in terms of North Korea’s mineral wealth 
and in terms of geographical location, for possible oil pipelines to feed the 
South Korean and Japanese markets. Third, Russia wants to be a 
stakeholder in the process of Korean unification.  
A reunified Korea would bring certain advantages: a new medium-sized 
power might balance Japan and China in the region. Furthermore, a 
reunified Korea might be neutral rather than a US ally, and while North 
Korea has often tended to function as a brake on Russian regional 
initiatives, a unified Korea might be a partner for Russia in developing the 
RFE, unlike China and Japan which so far have proven to be unreliable 
partners in this endeavour. In any case, the nature of any reunification 
process will be decisive: should it involve the implosion of the Pyongyang 
regime, this could have severely negative effects on the RFE. 
A fourth area – rarely mentioned – is the wider geopolitical role that all 
crises, including North Korea, afford Russia as it searches for ways to 
present itself as a “fixer” and great power to the international community.49  
Achieving its Objectives 
On 2 April 2012, Moscow and Pyongyang announced the commencement 
of a cross-border cargo freight service (a rail link) that would begin in 
October. It was to be constructed as part of the infrastructure expansion 
linking the Russian border town of Khasan to the Rajin-Sonbong Special 
Economic Zone. Both sides anticipated that successful completion of this 
rail link would lead to rail freight capacity estimated at 100,000 shipping 
containers per year to earn hard currency. Nevertheless, in spite of these 
developing projects, North Korea has remained above all a client state of 
Beijing, making it difficult for Russia to exert any profound influence in the 
country. In July 2018, Russia hosted a seminar to discuss trilateral economic 
cooperation with the two Koreas, but the South Korean policy is to link 
progress in the nuclear negotiations with economic collaboration.50   
Russia has also sought to promote the construction of a trans-Korean 
pipeline, which would benefit Pyongyang as it would be able to charge 
transit fees. A further project seeks to build a railway across the Peninsula. 
Some have mooted the idea of using North Korean labour in the RFE as 
North Koreans are perceived to be relatively skilled and “well disciplined”. 
It should be noted that there are already a large number of North Koreans 
                                                          
 
48 In the Amur region alone, Russian lumber companies have hired an estimated 1,500 North Koreans, and 
evidence indicates that Russian timber and other companies in the RFE continue to show interest in employing 
more North Korean workers.  
49 Ramani, S., ‘Why is Putin backing North Korea? To build up Russia as a great power’, The Washington Post, 
26 July 2018. 
50 ‘(Lead) Presidential panel discusses Rajin-Khasan cooperation during trip to N.K.’, Yonhap News, 15 July 
2018. 
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working in the RFE, mainly in the logging industry.51 There is a general 
shortfall in manpower in the RFE (the gap was filled for a while by Chinese 
workers but their numbers have fallen). In August 2017 both China and 
Russia agreed to sign up to UN sanctions targeting North Korea; the 
sanctions prohibit them from receiving additional workers from North 
Korea but this doesn’t affect those already residing in Russia and China. 
Furthermore, Russia was somewhat taken aback when China joined the USA 
in drawing up sanctions against North Korea in 2015, which threatened 
Russian economic interests. Russian policymakers have stressed that Russia 
needs to ensure that its economic and trade relations with North Korea are 
not neglected, stressing the importance to Moscow of participating in “the 
future opening up of North Korea”. This partly explains the Russian Duma’s 
in 2014 vote to write off 90% of the North Korean Soviet-era debt,52 and 
Russia’s policy of continuing to supply oil to North Korea despite the 
imposition of sanctions.  
Russia and North Korea both use roubles to trade and North Korea is 
permitted to open accounts with Russian banks. The two signed an 
agreement to increase trade to US$10 billion by 2020. During the first two 
months of 2017 trade between North Korea and Russia increased by 73%,53 
mainly consisting of deliveries of coal. Given the ban on importing coal from 
North Korea, Russia has been able to take advantage of this by increasing 
its exports to China in 2017 by 37%. Russia therefore has clear, if limited, 
economic interests in the Peninsula and is able to take advantage to some 
extent of North Korea’s isolation by being a niche supplier. 
Summary  
According to our panel, Russia tends to see the future of the Peninsula in 
terms of a gradual integration of the North into the South. This is not 
dissimilar from the USA’s implicit policy, but contrasts markedly with 
China’s policy of maintaining the status quo of the two Koreas. Despite this, 
it has often lent Pyongyang diplomatic support when it was most under 
pressure, indicating that Russia’s aims might be more status-quo than 
would first appear. Russia blocked a United Nations Security Resolution 
condemning North Korean nuclear testing in 2017 and denied that the 
missile launch conducted by North Korea was an ICBM. Ultimately, both 
Russia and, to a lesser extent, China may see North Korea nuclear testing 
as a lesser evil compared to instability on their borders. Both began 
discussions on opposing the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-
ballistic missile system in April 2015.54 A Sino–Russian Northeast Asian 
security dialogue was begun and both have pledged to strengthen their 
security cooperation on this issue.  
                                                          
 
51 Lankov, A., ‘The Real Story of North Korean Labor Camps in Russia’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 7 October 
2017. 
52 ‘Russia writes off 90 percent of North Korea debt, eyes gas pipeline’, Reuters, 19 April 2014. 
53 Dorell, O., ‘Russia’s boost in trade with North Korea worries U.S.’, USA Today, 7 June 2017. 
54 Power, J., ‘Russia: Korean THAAD Deployment is a Security Threat’, The Diplomat, 2 April 2015. 
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In July 2017 both China and Russia issued a statement calling on the USA, 
South Korea and North Korea to agree to a dual-freeze solution,55 which 
was largely symbolic yet significant as, despite the strategic partnership, 
the two do not routinely coordinate positions on nuclear issues. For Russia, 
the possible resumption of multilateral talks would be seen as an 
opportunity to turn these into a regional collective security framework. 
Overall, a reunified Korea might be in Russia’s interests; it seeks to diversify 
its Sinocentric Asia-Pacific policy and has sought to re-engage Japan in 
recent years. However, the uncertain trajectory and nature of China’s rise 
means that Russia’s strategic autonomy in the region remains 
circumscribed. 
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7. ANALYSIS           
This section examines the points raised in the preceding chapters in order 
to clarify how the negotiating baselines of the six nations facilitate or hinder 
the resolution of the North Korea crisis. How should we negotiate peace? 
In previous chapters we have seen that nearly every one of the six countries 
involved in this regional crisis has interests and objectives that either align, 
partially align or contradict those of the others. By focusing on this more 
carefully, it should become possible to discern the alignment points that 
help to further negotiations and those that derail or hinder them. 
Trade and economic self-interests: North Korea’s interest in economic 
reform and in real investment and financial growth aligns with China’s 
interest in a prosperous and stable regional order. Given North Korea’s 
desire to avoid over-dependence on Chinese largesse and to gain 
diplomatic recognition from international society, the USA and its allies 
would seem to have some leverage in offering alternative economic gains 
to Pyongyang in exchange for denuclearisation. The strength of this 
leverage, however, depends on how much Beijing and Moscow are willing 
to offset that with their own offers.  
Security and national interests: When it comes to perceptions of security 
and national interests, nearly every state – including the USA and its liberal 
democratic allies – has diverging interests. While Japan and South Korea 
are nominally supportive and dependent upon US security guarantees, they 
differ in the details, including on operational control during war, on the 
Trump administration’s inclination for a “bloody nose” preventive strike, 
and on Japanese military involvement in a conflict. When it comes to North 
Korean and Chinese perceptions of national security – and their hostility to 
the USA’s military presence in the region – these differences are even 
greater. Nearly all powers up to this point – with the obvious exception of 
North Korea – have preferred the status quo, when it comes to Pyongyang’s 
missile and nuclear weapons programme. 
Defining “denuclearisation”: While both the United States and North Korea 
agreed upon a “firm and unwavering commitment to complete 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” at the Singapore Summit, it is 
quite clear that each country interprets this quite differently. For its part, 
the USA is pursuing a quick bilateral deal which exchanges security 
guarantees and economic incentives for a complete and irreversible 
removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme and all components. 
Either for strategic reasons or out of mistrust, North Korea does not see this 
as a viable option and prefers to create a peace regime on the Peninsula 
which also implicitly calls for the removal of US forces from South Korea. 
Whether for strategic reasons or from a sense of insecurity created by the 
presence of nearby US military assets, this is a major block to progress.  
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Verification issues: Even if North Korea were to agree to the US definition 
of CVID, verification remains a major problem. It is both a trust-related issue 
and a highly technical one. In order for the United States to confirm that 
CVID has in fact taken place, it needs to be reassured that North Korea has 
not stockpiled nuclear materials and weapons. Given the fact that this 
would require the long-term insertion of third-party or US inspectors into 
many previously sensitive aspects of the North Korean security sector – a 
policy that has both emotional resonance and security risks for Pyongyang 
– it is clear that this issue will remain a major sticking point. The fact that 
this was the issue which ultimately derailed the Six-Party Talks in 2007 
should remind us of its importance. 
 
Three Scenarios 
In attempting to understand how these interests interact, we have drawn 
three scenarios which showcase the relationship between the states, their 
negotiation baselines, their assumptions and eventualities. In simple terms, 
we judge that these would be the best-case scenario, the middle-of-the-
road or muddling-along scenario, and the worst-case scenario.   
 
 
 
1. Best Case Scenario 
The scenario that we would 
consider the most ideal – 
from the perspective of all 
the actors as well as from 
the perspective of overall 
regional security – sees 
North Korea dismantling its 
nuclear weapons and 
missiles programme in 
return for security 
guarantees from the USA 
and China, and in return for 
economic incentives from 
regional powers (like 
Japan, South Korea and 
ASEAN) and the 
international community 
(like the EU, IMF and 
others).  
 
2. Middle-of-the-road 
This scenario sees a middle 
way, with US pressure 
continuing, but also with a 
breakdown of alliance 
solidarity between the US, 
South Korea and Japan, 
with Russia and China 
loosening sanctions enough 
for North Korea to relax its 
negotiations. In this 
scenario, the USA accepts 
North Korea’s preferred 
incremental approach, and 
there is a drawn-out 
diplomatic process in which 
Pyongyang offers minimum 
concessions for maximum 
gains. Ultimately, it is 
willing to denuclearise. 
 
3. Worst-case scenario 
This scenario would see a 
total breakdown of support 
for the US maximum 
pressure, in which case 
states would all begin to 
loosen economic sanctions 
on North Korea. In this 
scenario, recognising that it 
has lost control of the 
process, the USA seeks a 
containment policy or 
threatens to use force. 
Washington would have 
few choices here if South 
Korea resisted a move 
towards using force, 
potentially leading to a 
breakdown in the alliance 
and threatening regional 
stability. 
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1. Total Denuclearisation: The scenario that we would consider the most 
ideal – from the perspective of all the actors as well as from the 
perspective of overall regional security – sees North Korea 
dismantling its nuclear weapons and missiles programme in return for 
security guarantees from the USA and China, and in return for 
economic incentives from regional powers (like Japan, South Korea 
and ASEAN) and the international community (like the EU, IMF and 
others).  
 
In this scenario, Beijing and Washington hold joint responsibility for 
North Korea’s security and work closely on this and the wider issue 
of regional security. Recognising the heavy stakes for the region, they 
avoid letting their own bilateral tensions in trade and security spill 
into the negotiation process. 
 
In this best-case scenario, Russia and China refrain from weakening 
or undermining international sanctions prematurely and allow US and 
international sanctions to pressure the Kim regime into full CVID, all 
the while sending encouraging signals to North Korea. Furthermore, 
they defer to US–South Korean–North Korean leadership over the 
diplomatic process. 
 
This scenario sees South Korea construct a viable model for North–
South relations at the political and developmental level, a model that 
assuages Pyongyang’s insecurities and concerns while providing 
incentives for institutional change and reform – including a 
commitment to the advancement of human rights, a critical one for 
broad support of any constructive relationship with Seoul and 
Washington. 
 
In addition, Japan loosens its linkage between a resolution of the 
abductee issue and Japanese support for the peace process. Prime 
Minister Abe prioritises regional peace and security and makes 
resolution of the issue secondary to the peace process. He instead 
uses engagement as a route towards a long-term resolution of the 
abductees issue. 
 
2. Muddling along 
This scenario sees a middle way, with US pressure continuing, but also 
with small issues testing alliance solidarity between the USA, South 
Korea and Japan, while Russia and China loosen sanctions enough for 
North Korea to relax its negotiations. In this scenario, the USA could 
Diplomatic progress 
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react either by tacit acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea or 
by continuing to apply pressure on North Korea in the long run. 
 
In this scenario, China and Russia loosen sanctions enough to take the 
pressure off of North Korea, which encourages the regime to push for 
its own preferred agenda of incremental diplomacy and maximum 
gains for medium concessions. In this situation, South Korea 
pressures the USA to continue diplomatic channels and begins to 
make small economic concessions or promises of concessions to the 
North. 
 
Furthermore, Seoul, Moscow and Beijing give small economic 
concessions, with the promises of more after the North gives up its 
nuclear weapons programme. In other words, they continue to insist 
on CVID, but agree with Pyongyang that the process should be 
incremental and met with concessions from the USA and security 
guarantees.  
 
Outnumbered, the Trump administration continues to attempt 
negotiations and agrees to an incremental diplomatic process, while 
continuing to keep some economic pressure on the North through UN 
sanctions, bilateral American and Japanese sanctions. In this 
scenario, Seoul–Washington tensions increase as Seoul begins to take 
more and more of a middle position between the USA and North 
Korea.  
 
3. Breakdown conflict 
In this scenario, there is a total breakdown of support for the US 
maximum pressure, and other regional states would join Russia and 
China in the loosening of economic sanctions on North Korea. Russia 
and China would loosen sanctions greatly and interfere strongly in 
the diplomatic process, either to advance their own national interests 
or to thwart US diplomacy to gain leverage over Washington. 
 
Without economic pressure on it, North Korea might continue to push 
for a peace regime on the Peninsula, but offer the minimal 
concessions for maximum gains vis-à-vis the USA. In this scenario, it 
is likely that the Kim regime would seek to have its cake and eat it – 
that is to say, to break down its economic and diplomatic isolation 
while maintaining a robust nuclear weapons programme. It would 
offer an insincere appearance of a negotiation process. 
 
Recognising that it has lost control of the process, the USA would be 
compelled either to admit defeat and accept a de facto nuclear North 
Korea or to consider some sort of containment policy. In this scenario, 
NEGOTIATING THE PEACE: DIPLOMACY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
a breakdown over diplomacy also raises the prospect for conflict as 
the Trump administration might consider a nuclear threat over the US 
mainland to be intolerable. 
In such a scenario, the USA would begin to move forces to the region 
either in tandem or in opposition to the government in Seoul. 
Washington would have few choices here if South Korea were to 
resist a move towards using force, potentially leading to a breakdown 
in the alliance. In such a dynamic, Japan would find itself with more 
leverage as Washington sought allies and a base of operations.  
 
8. CONCLUSION          
 
“The Schleswig-Holstein question is so complicated, only three men in 
Europe have ever understood it. One was Prince Albert, who is dead. The 
second was a German professor who became mad. I am the third and I have 
forgotten all about it.” 
~Lord Palmerston, 1875 (apocryphal)   
 
As with many reviews of North Korea, this study recognised from the very 
beginning that there are many “known unknowns”, and that the crisis 
presents diplomats with one of the most complex and high-stakes riddles 
in international relations.  
Briefly, the crisis involves at least six powers with six different agendas and 
negotiating baselines – some with greater power, some with less.  
The six powers are roughly arranged on two sides, with the USA, South 
Korea and Japan on one side and North Korea, China and Russia on the 
other. Despite this apparent clarity in players, there is nevertheless a real 
possibility of minor defections over key issues on each “side”. For example, 
South Korea and Russia might well offer economic concessions that play to 
other agendas beyond resolving the crisis. China, concerned with the status 
quo, might fear losing North Korea from its orbit and begin to loosen 
sanctions and offer economic gains so as to spoil the process. 
There are also secondary tensions not specifically related to the nuclear 
crisis, which nevertheless “bleed” into it. These include the historical issue 
between Japan and China/South Korea/North Korea, US–China and US–
Russia tensions, and the issue of which is the “true” Korea, between North 
and South Korea. 
As Scott Snyder wrote in the 2009 China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, there 
are other ways in which the players’ negotiating positions line up, which he 
argues occur through the prism of various trilateral groupings. For example, 
the USA and South Korea line up against North Korea; China and North 
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Korea line up against the USA; the North and South line up – at times – 
against the USA; and the North and South line up against Japan. 
So what is the answer to this conundrum (or series of conundrums)? Given 
the failures in past negotiations, shifting American positions and the 
apparent duplicity of North Korea in having parallel nuclear programmes, it 
is clear that trust must be prioritised if the process is to be successful. If 
trust is to be prioritised, however, the Libya example demands that the USA 
give up its demand for immediate CVID and agree to a step-by-step 
process. 
In this process, however, North Korea will have to give up its immediate 
demands for a peace regime on the Peninsula, which does not engender 
trust in Washington and Seoul and is viewed as a delaying tactic. Japan will 
have to give up the abductee issue in the short term, and prioritise regional 
concerns. Russia will have to halt the pursuit of its own narrow self-interests 
and allow a constructive process to take place. China and the US will have 
to wall off their bilateral security and trade rivalries from this issue. If the 
USA does not use force on the Korean Peninsula and continues to bargain 
with the North in good faith, Beijing will maintain maximum pressure on 
Pyongyang. 
In such a scenario, all players will have to give up something, but will gain 
something else in doing so. It requires an altruistic approach and the widest 
definition of self-interest to be applied by a group of power states, all of 
whom have various competing interests. While it is well beyond the scope 
of this paper to offer a precise table of negotiations, we believe the 
following considerations and principles should be pursued by all parties if 
peace is to be given a chance. These are not in any order or prioritisation, 
but clearly some are more important than others to the various players.  
 The willingness to give concessions and adopt a wider view of self-
interest. 
 An acknowledgement by all sides that conflict is a real possibility 
should negotiations fail. 
 A guarantee of regime security for both North and South Korea. 
 A step-by-step process by which North Korea’s moves to dismantle 
its programme (observed by neutral parties) is matched by US 
loosening of sanctions and other pressures. 
 An acknowledgement by all sides that a peace regime led by the USA 
and China is necessary upon the completion of the CVID process. 
 A serious USA/South Korea/Japan plan (with international support) 
for reconstructing North Korea through aid programmes or promises 
of investment, to be implemented after the conclusion of the peace 
regime. 
 A recognition by North Korea that major human rights abuses will 
threaten the overall process and jeopardise any resulting agreement 
with the USA. 
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While we believe that peace is possible without some of these and that we 
are highly likely to see a situation in which all six parties continue along 
scenario two, where all continue to “muddle along”, neither resolving the 
crisis nor going to war, we do not see this as ideal. It might be realistic, but 
all it means is that a dangerous tripwire to regional and nuclear war remains 
present in our midst. For us, this is an unacceptable danger to humanity. To 
paraphrase Kim Jong-un, the obstacles are not even that high for us to 
cross. 
All we have to do is walk across. 
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